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NOTE
IS THERE A RIGHT TO UNILATERAL
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND, IF
NOT, DO CATHOLIC SOCIAL PRINCIPLES
DEMAND ONE?
JOHN P. CURLEY'
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, then-Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi
Annan addressed the General Assembly and heralded in a new
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.1 According to Annan's
vision, state sovereignty would no longer be an obstacle to
interventions aimed at safeguarding "individual sovereignty,"
which he defined as "the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of each and every individual."2 Annan's address both
recognized the "developing international norm"3 of humanitarian
intervention and acknowledged the United Nations' two recent
failures in this area. In Kosovo and Rwanda, the organization
failed to react appropriately to instances of human rights
, Senior Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; St. John's University School of
Law, J.D., 2008, B.A., 2003, College of the Holy Cross. The author is grateful for
insightful guidance from Professor Susan J. Stabile.
I Annan explained that the mission of the United Nations
continues in a world transformed by geo-political, economic, technological
and environmental changes whose lasting significance still eludes us. As
we seek new ways to combat the ancient enemies of war and poverty, we
will succeed only if we all adapt our Organization to a world with new
actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress.
Kofi A. Annan, Sec'y-Gen., United Nations, Annual Report to the General Assembly
(Sept. 20, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Annual Report], available at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments searchfull.asp?statID=28. One
commentator characterized the speech as a "critical turn" in the debate over the
organization's role in an increasingly globalized world. He noted that "the world's
top diplomat also wants to be the world's policeman." James P. Pinkerton, No One
Escapes the New World Order, NEWSDAY, Sept. 23, 1999, at A55.
2 1999 Annual Report, supra note 1.
3 Id.
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violations.4 In Rwanda, the organization's inaction enabled mass
murder, 5 and in Kosovo, NATO forces fought to stop ethnic
cleansing while the United Nations debated. Annan lamented
his organization's deadlock, explaining "[t]he inability.., to
reconcile... two equally compelling interests-universal
legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of human rights-can
only be viewed as a tragedy."6
Realizing that a change to the international understanding
of state sovereignty would be unwelcome by many,7 Annan
nevertheless elaborated on the competing points of view that tore
at the United Nations while NATO deployed to Kosovo:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of
international order is the use of force in the absence of a
Security Council mandate, one might ask-not in the context of
Kosovo-but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days
and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had
been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did
not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a
coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when
States and groups of States can take military action outside the
established mechanisms for enforcing international law, one
might ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions
undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system
created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous
precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to
decide who might invoke these precedents, and in what
circumstances?
8
4 Id.
' Id.; see also Editorial, Talking Darfur to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at
A14 [hereinafter Editorial, Talking Darfur to Death] (noting that the United
Nations' failure in Rwanda is similar to its present-day failure in Darfur); infra Part
I.
6 1999 Annual Report, supra note 1.
7 See id. ("Any such evolution in our understanding of State sovereignty and
individual sovereignty will, in some quarters, be met with distrust, scepticism, even
hostility.").
s Id. In 2000, President Clinton also noted the tension between state
sovereignty and protecting human rights when he spoke at the United Nations
Millennium Summit that year. Discussing whether the United Nations should
intervene in ethnic and religious conflicts, he asked: "Are they part of the scourge
the U.N. was established to prevent? If so, we must respect sovereignty and
territorial integrity, but still find a way to protect people as well as borders." David
E. Sanger, Clinton Warns U.N. of a New Age of Civil Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2000, at Al.
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Annan's remarks underscore a dilemma in international law:
whether states are free to undertake humanitarian interventions
without authorization from the Security Council and, if not,
whether they ought to be.9 This Note undertakes a secular legal
analysis to answer the first question, and concludes that all
signatories to the United Nations Charter are legally prohibited
from deploying troops unilaterally, except in specific
circumstances that do not encompass humanitarian missions.
This Note examines the second question through the lens of
Catholic social principles and the Just War Theory's requirement
of proper authorization.
These are relevant issues today because answers to these
questions help inform the debate over foreign policy in the
United States. In the years after the first Gulf War, President
Clinton and the candidates vying to succeed him in 2000
articulated a variety of ideas about what American foreign policy
should be."° On one end, there are those who would see
humanitarian intervention used to cure any injustice,
worldwide. 1 On the other end of the spectrum are minimalists-
modern-day isolationists-who would see the United States
commit to battle only when its vital interests are at stake. 2 In
between are thinkers who would support American intervention
for limited causes in limited circumstances. Even assuming
policymakers can formulate a consistent doctrine for when to use
force, there is further debate about how the United States
should implement its doctrine. Clinton espoused multinational
cooperation to achieve humanitarian goals, but-along with some
Republicans-he was willing to see the United States pursue a
' There are different ways for one nation to leverage its power against another.
For the purposes of this Note, however, "humanitarian intervention" means the use
of military force by one nation within the borders of another, aimed at stopping
flagrant human rights abuses.
10 See Doyle McManus, U.S. Casts About for Anchor in Waters of Post-Cold War
World, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at A6.
" The "Clinton Doctrine" is an example of this type of thinking. See id.
(explaining that the Clinton Doctrine "declares the United States ready to undertake
humanitarian intervention all over the world"). For an argument in favor of
democratic republics pursuing a policy of international intervention, see Paul W.
Kaufman, Green Berets, Blue Berets... White Berets? How & When Republics
Participate in Humanitarian Military Intervention, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
81 (2006).
12 See McManus, supra note 10.
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unilateral course. 13 Post-September 11th, President Bush has
similarly advocated a unilateral position. This Note helps
advance the debate over unilateral action by examining whether
it is legal and, if not, whether it is morally acceptable
nevertheless.
Two regrettable themes permeate this discussion. First, the
analysis is almost entirely normative rather than practical. The
United Nations is an organization predicated on the participation
of sovereign nations; in many respects, its human rights failures
can be traced back to the shortcomings of its members.
Moreover, a unilateral right of intervention is useless without
nations that are actually willing to intervene unilaterally. Since
the United Nations reduces the collective action problem by
dispersing both the human and financial cost of interventions,
unilateral interventions are unlikely to move forward in
situations where the United Nations routinely fails. On the
other hand, some of the organization's failures can be blamed on
procedural obstacles that Security Council members can exploit
to stall United Nations action. Given this, some nations might
act outside the parameters of the United Nations if they had the
legal authority to do so.14
The second theme that runs throughout this Note is the
failure of the international community to come to a consensus
about what human rights are and at what level they should be
protected. The conclusion this Note reaches-that there ought to
be a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention under
international law-opens the door to military deployments
restrained only by an understanding of what a human rights
violation looks like. The analysis in Part IV largely takes for
granted that the global community will one day reach such a
consensus and discusses its ramifications. 5
Part I discusses the genocide in Rwanda to illustrate the
great need for solutions to these questions presented. Part II
discusses individual states' rights and responsibilities under the
United Nations Charter (the "Charter") and concludes that, in
the absence of a Security Council mandate, sovereign nations
may not legally deploy troops internationally. Part III considers
the Just War tradition, particularly its requirements of just
13 Id.
" See infra note 160.
15 For further discussion of this point, see infra Part III.B.
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cause and proper authority, and looks at whether the concept of
proper authorization must be recalculated in light of the
constraints the Charter places on sovereign states. Finally, Part
IV examines whether Catholic social principles demand the kind
of right of unilateral intervention that does not currently exist
under international law.
I. THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
To understand fully the importance of these issues, it is
helpful to examine an example. Over thirteen weeks in the
spring of 1994, half a million people were slaughtered in the
Rwandan genocide. 16 The Hutu-run government sponsored the
systematic elimination of the minority Tutsi tribe; according to
one estimate, three-quarters of its population fell victim to the
killing.1 7 Additionally, thousands of Hutu perished for opposing
the brutal campaign.'8 The Human Rights Watch detailed the
evolution of the genocidal tactics:
In the first days of killing in Kigali, assailants sought out and
murdered targeted individuals and also went systematically
from house to house in certain neighborhoods, killing Tutsi and
Hutu opposed to Habyarimana. Administrative officials, like
the prefect of the city of Kigali, ordered local people to establish
barriers to catch Tutsi trying to flee and to organize search
patrols to discover those trying to hide.
By the middle of the first week of the genocide, organizers
began implementing a different strategy: driving Tutsi out of
their homes to governmentoffices [sic], churches, schools or
other public sites, where they would subsequently be massacred
in large-scale operations.
Towards the end of April, authorities declared a campaign of
"pacification," which meant not an end to killing, but greater
control over killing. Sensitive to criticism from abroad-muted
though it was-authorities ended most large-scale
massacres.... They ordered militia and other citizens to bring
suspects to officials for investigation and then murder instead of
simply killing them where they found them. Authorities used
"pacification" also as a tactic to lure Tutsi out of hiding to be
killed.
16 ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
1 (1999).
17 Id.
18 Id.
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By mid-May, the authorities ordered the final phase, that of
tracking down the last surviving Tutsi. They sought to
exterminate both those who had hidden successfully and those
who had been spared thus far-like women and children-or
protected by their status in the community, like priests and
medical workers. As the RPF advanced through the country,
assailants also hurried to eliminate any survivors who might be
able to testify about the slaughter.
Throughout the genocide, Tutsi women were often raped,
tortured and mutilated before they were murdered.19
Throughout this brutality, the international community-
particularly the United Nations-responded inadequately. The
Human Rights Watch characterized the organization's response
as both "slow" and "stingy."2' As the United Nations weighed its
response options, one in-house expert predicted nearly 8,000
ground troops would be needed for an effective peacekeeping
mission. The United Nations' commander on the ground
requested 4,500 soldiers. Nevertheless, when the Security
Council finally authorized a military response, its force
numbered only 2,548.21 The United Nations has been harshly
criticized for its failures in the years since the full story of what
happened in Rwanda came to light, and even Kofi Annan
acknowledged that the organization's response to the crisis was a
disaster.22  The United Nations' experience in Rwanda
underscores the point Annan was making when he posed those
critical questions to the General Assembly in 1999.23
II. THE U.N. CHARTER PROHIBITS UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
A secular analysis of a unilateral right of intervention must
begin with the United Nations Charter.24 Signed by virtually
1' Id. at 9-10.
20 Id. at 131.
21 Id. at 132. The United States advocated for a much smaller number of ground
troops. See id. This is a piece in the pattern of resistance to United Nations goals by
superpowers, which is discussed in the Introduction, supra.
22 Kofi A. Annan, Sec'y-Gen., United Nations, Speech at the Time Warner
Center (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/
statments-full.asp?statlD=39.
21 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
2'4 Aside from jus cogens, the U.N. Charter is the paramount expression of
international law. The agreement itself explicitly states that it receives priority in
all situations where its provisions conflict with other forms of international law.
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every state,25 the Charter governs a wide range of international
conduct.26 Its most important provision, Article 2(4), expressly
prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state."27 This rule, read
in accordance with the international norms of treaty
interpretation, proscribes the type of intervention contemplated
by this Note.2" The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties includes the following rule: "A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose."2 9 Read plainly, Article 2(4)
prohibits states from using force outside their borders. This is in
keeping with the Charter's object and purpose, which was "a
global effort to prohibit unilateral determinations of the just war
by vesting sole authority for the non-defensive use of force in the
Security Council."30  Thus, at the outset, there is no room for
individual states to undertake humanitarian missions abroad
without violating this major tenet of the Charter.
The Charter provides two exceptions to its rule against
military intervention. First, recognizing the "inherent right of
individual or collective" self-defense, the Charter permits the use
of force to counteract military aggression by others. 1 This
U.N. Charter art. 103.
25 Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules?
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 180
(J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003).
26 See generally U.N. Charter.
27 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
28 See supra note 9.
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, para. 1, opened for
signature on May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Convention was not ratified by
the United States. Nevertheless, even states that are not parties to the agreement
view the norms contained therein as representative of current customary
international law. Byers & Chesterman, supra note 25. Customary international law
is derived from an assessment of widespread state practice, where that practice is
done out of a sense of legal obligation. Customary international law is considered
binding on all states which have not affirmatively objected to the general practice.
See id. at 179.
3o Byers & Chesterman, supra note 25, at 181.
31 U.N. Charter art. 51. It provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
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provision is not a blank check for counterforce. Member nations
must immediately report any action taken to the Security
Council and, crucially, the Charter only recognizes a right to
unilateral self-defense until such a time as the Security Council
can consider and implement an appropriate international
response.3 2
The second exception to the prohibition of force stems from
the Security Council's authority under Chapter VII of the
Charter to authorize military action it deems necessary to
"maintain or restore international peace and security."3 3  The
Security Council has a range of options it can use to deter bad
behavior by international actors, including economic sanctions or
the severing of diplomatic relations. 4 Where it deems these
measures inadequate, it can resort to force,35 and it has done so
in sixty peacekeeping missions since 1948.36 The Security
Council's Chapter VII mandate is broad, and it can include
humanitarian motives as a justification for invoking its
authority. The significance of this section of the Charter,
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
32 See id.
3 U.N. Charter art. 42. It reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
Id.
I' See U.N. Charter art. 41. Economic sanctions enjoy mixed success, but they
can work. They persuaded Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi to turn over two men
charged with the Pan Am 103 bombing. On the other hand, severe economic
sanctions did not deter Saddam Hussein from remaining secretive about his
weapons of mass destruction programs. See Judith Miller, The World: Checkered
Flags; Sovereignty Isn't so Sacred Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, § 4, at 4.
" See U.N. Charter art. 42. Sanctions can also harm the people they are
designed to help, when leaders of sanctioned nations make the most vulnerable
within their borders bear the economic burdens, or where embargos prevent the
import of dual-use goods that might be used for health and safety needs. See
Editorial, A Success Worth Noting in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, § 4, at 14.
" See United Nations, U.N. Security Council: Structure, http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/unscstructure.html (last visited July 12, 2007).
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however, lies not with the justifications for force but rather that,
when this section is coupled with the general prohibition of the
use of force in Article 2(4), the Security Council is the sole arbiter
of the legitimate use of military force.
This is the most persuasive analysis of the Charter, but it is
not the only one. There is a wide range of opinions about what
Article 2(4) actually forbids.3" There is no serious disagreement
that the exceptions detailed above--defensive force and force
authorized by the Security Council pursuant its Chapter VII
power-permit deployments that fall within these categories.38
Scholars disagree, however, about the treatment human rights-
oriented missions should receive under the Charter. Some are
opposed to humanitarian intervention in any form, some oppose
unilateral intervention but concede United Nations-authorized
intervention, and others argue for a unilateral right of
intervention based, in part, on the purposes of the United
Nations.39  One author, responding to the idea that the
organization was founded principally to prevent wars between
states, argues that "[t]he promotion of human rights is as
important a purpose in the Charter as is the control of
international conflict."4"
There is little doubt that the protection of human rights was
and remains today an important purpose of the United Nations,41
but the founders of the organization provided for the possibility
of international human rights intervention when they drafted
Chapter VII.4 2  Under the Charter, the United Nations is
perfectly able to use force to protect human rights; it demands
only that the organization authorize each mission. That the
37 See FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY 147 (1997).
38 Id. at 146.
19 Id. at 147. Recall that, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, provisions must be interpreted in light of the agreement's purpose. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
40 TESON, supra note 37, at 151.
41 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1. One of the enumerated purposes of the United
Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Id.
42 One commentator argues that, since Chapter VII authority is only implicated
when there is a threat to international peace and security, permitting force in only
these situations "shields from intervention cases of gross human rights violations
that do not produce transboundary effects." TESON, supra note 37, at 153.
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United Nations sought to act as a clearinghouse for international
conflict is supported with evidence from the Charter and the
historical backdrop against which the organization was created.
The Charter lists maintaining "international peace and
security 4 3 and the "adjustment or settlement of international
disputes"44 first among the organization's purposes. Additionally,
the historical context in which the United Nations was founded-
the aftermath of World War II-lends credence to the idea that
preventing interstate conflict, the likes of which were raw in
many memories, weighed heavily on the minds of its creators.4 5
Accordingly, the Charter is more accurately interpreted by
recognizing the United Nations' monopoly over the legitimate use
of international force.46
The Catholic Church agrees that the Charter must be
interpreted to ban all military interventions not authorized by
the United Nations. In his Message for the 2004 World Day of
Peace, Pope John Paul II told the world:
The task of watching over global peace and security and with
encouraging the efforts of States to preserve and guarantee
these fundamental goods of humanity was entrusted by
Governments to an organization established for this purpose-
the United Nations Organization-with a Security Council
invested with broad discretionary power. Pivotal to the system
was the prohibition of the use of force. This prohibition,
according to the well-known Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, makes provision for only two exceptions.
47
11 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
4Id.
45 See, e.g., Stephen Schlesinger, U.N. Revival, DAILY REV. (Haward, Cal.), Sept.
28, 2003 (characterizing the traditional role of the U.N. as that of a "peacemaker and
security guarantor"). The author explained that two of its key founders, Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman, "[having endured the most calamitous war in
history ... extracted from the human propensity for devastation the right lesson for
our time." Id.; see also U.N. Charter pmbl. ("We the peoples of the United Nations
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind ....").
46 See, e.g., Milton J. Esman & Shibley Telhami, Introduction, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 1, 1 (Milton J. Esman &
Shibley Telhami eds., 1995) (explaining that "state system values" usually trump
"human rights values" at the U.N.); MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST
WAR?: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE BY STATES AT
THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY 1 (2004) (noting that use of force is "monopolised"
by the United Nations).
47 JOHN PAUL II, MESSAGE 2004 WORLD DAY OF PEACE 6 (2004).
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NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo demonstrates that the
legal prohibitions of the Charter do not always achieve the
organization's goal of managing global conflict through
international consensus. In this instance, force was used by a
group of individual states outside the sanction of the United
Nations to stop ethnic cleansing.4" This raises the question
Annan posed to the General Assembly in 1999: "If, in those dark
days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States
had been prepared to act.., but did not receive prompt Council
authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and
allowed the horror to unfold?"4 9 In other words, where the
United Nations fails to safeguard human rights, as it has done in
the past, should there be a unilateral right to intervene? The
Just War tradition and Catholic Social Principles provide a guide
for this analysis.
III. A UNILATERAL RIGHT OF INTERVENTION VIEWED THROUGH
THE JUST WAR TRADITION
A. Overview
Over the years, the Just War tradition has seen a variety of
permutations.,0  St. Augustine believed there were five
prerequisites to just war.51 St. Thomas Aquinas listed three
requirements that made the use of force proper. 2 Contemporary
48 A multinational alliance like NATO is treated differently in this analysis than
an international body like the United Nations. The distinction turns on whether the
organization is designed primarily to regulate conduct between members of the
organization and outsiders, like NATO, or between members themselves, like the
United Nations. Esman & Telhami, supra note 46, at 2-3. Recall that Article 103 of
the U.N. Charter provides that, in case of a conflict between the Charter and any
other agreement to which a member is a party, the U.N. Charter prevails. See supra
note 24.
49 1999 Annual Report, supra note 1.
50 Just War theorists are concerned with two issues: the morality of going to war
in the first place (the jus ad bellum), and the morality of how wars are fought once
they are begun (the jus in bello). See John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just
War Tradition, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 221, 223 (2004). To understand the legitimacy
of humanitarian intervention, it is necessary to assess the jus ad bellum to
determine when, if ever, states are morally justified in resorting to force.
11 St. Augustine's prerequisites were: legitimate authority, just cause,
proportionality, last resort, and the goal of achieving peace. Bruce Duncan, What the
Just War Tradition Has to Offer Today, COMPASS: REV. TOPICAL THEOLOGY, Winter
2003, http://compassreview.org/winter03/7.html.
52 St. Thomas Aquinas' requirements were: proper authority, just cause, and
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authors list different requirements, but the themes identified by
these early scholars remain largely intact.53 Two requirements-
just cause and proper authority-have persevered through the
ages.54 They are linked with one another," and this analysis will
consider both in an attempt to understand when states are
morally justified to go to war for humanitarian purposes. Some
requirements, like proportionality and the use of force only as a
last resort,5 6 are fact-intensive inquiries that are properly made
after the other requirements are deemed satisfied. The just
cause and proper authority requirements, however, implicate
questions of morality, and they are the starting point for this
discussion.
B. The Protection of Human Rights as a Just Cause for Force
In subsequent sections, this Note assumes for the purpose of
argument that humanitarian intervention may be a just cause
for using force." To some theorists, humanitarian intervention is
troublesome, because it offends the notion of sovereignty that
underlies the international system.58 Nevertheless, theorists
justify intervention in extreme cases by recognizing a universal
quality to human rights that predates sovereignty's place as the
bedrock of international law. 9
right intention. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 40, art. 1, at
165 (2d ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2002) (1266-1273) [hereinafter SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE].
' See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 50, at 229. Coverdale identifies four
requirements: just cause, lawful authority, proportionality, and last resort. Id.; see
also KAROUBI, supra note 46, at 77. Citing J.T. Johnson, The Just War Tradition
and the American Military, Just War and the Gulf War, in ETHICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY CENTER (1991), Karoubi discusses seven criteria: just cause, proper
authority, right intention, goal of restoring peace, proportionality, reasonable chance
for success, and last resort.
4 Clement of Alexandria (circa 150-215 A.D.), one of the first Just War
thinkers, incorporated these requirements in his thinking. Following Clement, St.
Ambrose also demanded just cause and lawful authority. Duncan, supra note 51.
55 Coverdale, supra note 50, at 250.
5 These non-violent measures are contemplated by the U.N. Charter's Chapter
VII, which vests with the Security Council the power to authorize use of force, but
only where it deems non-violent measures inadequate. U.N. Charter art. 42.
57 See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 50, at 238 (explaining that contemporary
theorists include humanitarian motives among those that might justify going to
war).
"8 Id. at 239; see also 1999 Annual Report, supra note 1.
'9 See Coverdale, supra note 50, at 239-40.
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Thomas Aquinas characterized "just cause" as one in which
"the enemy deserve[s] to have war waged against it because of
some wrong it has inflicted."60 Aquinas spoke in a time before
the Peace of Westphalia gave rise to an international order
premised on state sovereignty and is therefore not an answer to
those who are concerned that humanitarian intervention violates
that sovereignty.
His third requirement-that just warriors have a "right
intention"-suggests that the wrongs he contemplated in his just
cause analysis extended beyond the traditional interstate
conflict. He quotes Gratian-though he incorrectly attributes the
statement to Augustine: "[W]ars waged with zeal for peace and
not out of desire for gain or out of cruelty, wars waged to restrain
the wicked and assist the good, are also conducive of peace."61
This definition would certainly apply to a humanitarian mission
aimed at restoring peace in a region torn by ethnic killing or kept
hungry by manipulative warlords-modern-day examples of
deployments undertaken to "restrain the wicked." Further, he
quotes Psalm 82:4: "Rescue the poor and free the needy from the
hands of sinners."62
In the modern sense, Aquinas' formulation is too broad to be
particularly helpful. It lacks specificity, and its plain language
undoubtedly encompasses more grounds for intervention than
many nations would be comfortable supporting today. Scholars
disagree about the extent to which human rights motives can be
used to justify armed intervention. One writer suggests the
following criteria for determining whether humanitarian
intervention is justified: (1) the intervention must be aimed at
governments, (2) the "collateral non-humanitarian motives" must
"not impair or reduce the first paramount human rights
objective," and (3) "the means used must always be rights-
inspired. '63  Another scholar argues that armed humanitarian
intervention can be justified in theory, but because it necessarily
involves taking lives by force, it is seldom justified in practice. 64
60 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 52.
61 Id. (quoting GRATIAN, DECRETUM II, causa 23, Q. 1, c. 6).
62 Id.
6 TESON, supra note 37, at 121.
See Anthony Ellis, War, Revolution, and Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 17, 31
(Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003).
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This type of disagreement leaves a very difficult question. If
scholars through the ages-from Aquinas' time to the present-
agree that humanitarian motives can be enough to justify force,
the issue becomes whether nations recognize a threshold degree
of violation that consistently justifies intervention. One
commentator points out that the answer turns on the "complex"
question of "whether or not there are any truly universal values
in the world."65  Recent history clearly indicates that the
international community has not yet come to a consensus about
what types of behavior constitute intervention-worthy rights
violations.66 The analysis in subsequent sections of this Note
adopts, for the sake of argument, the idea that there might one
day be a global understanding about what human rights are and
what remedies are appropriate in the face of rights violations.
The next section assumes a situation in which human rights
violations have surpassed this as-yet-undefined universal
threshold level and considers from where lawful authority is
conferred in an age marked by increasing global cooperation.6
C. Who Is the Proper Authority?
When Aquinas wrote that "it belongs to no private citizen to
initiate war," but "[r]ather, since the care of the commonweal has
been committed to rulers, it belongs to them to protect the
commonweal of the city or kingdom or province subject to
them,"68 he recognized the need for a pragmatic requirement
aimed at deterring minor nobles from waging wars of private
aggression. 69 The requirement also reflected the idea that moral
authority for making war rested with kings, not citizens.70 In the
centuries that followed, this requirement was obviated by the
increased importance of state sovereignty in the international
6 Jovan Babic, Foreign Armed Intervention: Between Justified Aid and Illegal
Violence, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES,
supra note 64, at 45, 46.
Compare the international responses to Kosovo and Rwanda. Both were
failures from the United Nations' perspective, but for different reasons. In Kosovo,
NATO recognized actionable human rights violations where the United Nations did
not, and in Rwanda, the United Nations recognized violations but acted too weakly
to halt them.
" See, e.g., infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
68 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 52.
69 See Coverdale, supra note 50, at 248.
'0 See id. at 248-49. The moral authority rationale was eventually subsumed
into the notion of state sovereignty. Id. at 249.
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calculus.71 Unlike Aquinas, theorists and policymakers in the
age of traditional state sovereignty could "take for granted the
public monopoly on the use of force."72 Today, the international
legal structure is moving from a system predicated on traditional
sovereignty to one increasingly based on a supranational model.73
International cooperation, particularly in the area of human
rights, is on the rise. This is evidenced by, among other things,
the increased use of international criminal tribunals to prosecute
leaders of genocide, such as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.74 Indeed,
Kofi Annan understood that a doctrine valuing humanitarian
intervention over state sovereignty was really the "embracing [ofl
an 'evolving' international norm."75 The question that remains is
whether the United Nations should be-as its Charter
demands-the only authority that can legitimately authorize
humanitarian intervention.
Aquinas' historical rationale for the legitimate authority
prong cannot be readily applied to the argument that the United
Nations should be the only body that can properly declare war.
International human rights-oriented aid has been undertaken
only by democracies with a level of resources sufficient to enable
them to expend these resources abroad in exchange for little, if
any, return in their national interests.76 These democratic
powers have demonstrated their ability to retain the monopoly of
legitimate force. For example, the American military has a
proud tradition of a tightly-ordered chain of command, topped by
civilian, democratically-elected leadership. Nations that deploy
their forces for humanitarian goals are not plagued by private
civil wars. On the other hand, fighting does still happen, and to
71 See id. As the notion of state sovereignty developed, "[aluthors working
within the just war tradition mentioned the requirement of just authority, but gave
it little importance." Id.
11 See id. at 250.
13 See, e.g., Laura Cruz et al., Policy Point-Counterpoint: Is Westphalia History?,
80 INT'L SOC. SCI. REV. 151, 153 (2005) ("Multinational corporations and globalism
in general appear to be on the brink of superceding the state as the basis of
international affairs."); John C. Yoo, UN Wars, US War Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L.
355, 361 (2000) (noting a "recent rise in [American] cooperation with international
organizations").
" See Miller, supra note 34.
75 Id.
7 The legitimate authority requirement would be relevant to a discussion of the
just war tradition as applied to extra-national militants, an interesting topic that is
outside the scope of this Note.
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the extent that it is the United Nations' ambition to promote
peace and deter conflict, arguably Aquinas' fears of rogue nobles
laying perpetual waste to each other's armies can be transposed
to the modern context. Viewed from this perspective, individual
states that wage war without Security Council authorization are
really just an updated version of Aquinas' rogues.
Kofi Annan eloquently identified the tension between
protecting human rights on one hand and the inherent value in a
stable international system ordered by the positivist law of
treaties like the Charter, on the other.77 These competing ideas
must be weighed against each other to assess whether there
ought to be a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention. For
guidance, this Note turns to the principles of Catholic social
teaching.
IV. CATHOLIC SOCIAL PRINCIPLES DEMAND A RIGHT OF
UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN CONTRAVENTION
OF THE U.N. CHARTER
A. Overview
This section addresses whether-the Charter's prohibition
notwithstanding-Catholic social teaching demands a right of
unilateral intervention. To start, it is important to note that
Catholic teaching is especially relevant to this area because of
the emphasis it places on both human rights and the idea of an
international community.7" Catholic social principles teach
77 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
78 Professor Stephen J. Pope explained why Catholic teachings on natural law,
and John Courtney Murray's "tradition of reason," are helpful in analyzing the
moral questions with which civil authorities are confronted, using the just war
tradition as an example:
The development of the just war theory provides a helpful example of how
this approach to natural law functions. It provides criteria for interpreting
and analyzing the morality of aggression, noncombatant immunity,
treatment of prisoners of war, targeting policies, and the like. Though the
origin of the just war theory lay in antiquity and medieval theology, its
principles were further developed by international law in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, and refined by lawyers, secular moral
philosophers, and political theorists in the twentieth century. It continues
to be subject to further examination and application in light of evolving
concerns about humanitarian intervention, preemptive strikes against
terrorists, and uses of weapons of mass destruction. The danger that it will
be used to rationalize decisions made on nonmoral grounds is as real today
as it was in the eighteenth century, but the "tradition of reason" at least
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respect for the common good, as measured in terms of the dignity
of each person. Civil authorities derive their power not only from
positivist law, but also from the extent to which political leaders
strive toward morally-sound judgments.79 Obedience to civil
authorities is really obedience to God.80 The Church recognizes
that the United Nations makes valuable contributions to the
protection of human dignity, which gives it some measure of
moral authority. Obedience to the Charter, therefore, can
coincide with Catholic teaching. This moral legitimacy ceases,
however, when the organization fails to protect human dignity
and is no longer a force for the common good.
B. Catholic Social Principles Place Paramount Importance on
Human Dignity and the Common Good
Catholic social teaching, particularly since the papacy of
John XXIII, has been firmly anchored by the principle of human
dignity."1 As Professor Stephen J. Pope explained, John XXIII
"was the first pope.., to treat human rights as the standard
against which every social order is evaluated." 2 Pacem in Terris,
one of John XXIII's major encyclicals, held as a "key principle" 3
the idea "that each individual man is truly a person." 4 The
document has many references to the dignity of the individual
person. 5
offers some rational criteria for engaging in public debate over where to
draw the ethical line between what is ethically permissible and what is not.
Stephen J. Pope, Natural Law in Catholic Social Teachings, in MODERN CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 41, 53 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005).
79 See, e.g., JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PAcEM IN TERRIS 98 (1963)
[hereinafter PACEM IN TERRIS].
80 Pope John XXIII wrote:
[Citizens'] obedience to civil authorities is never an obedience paid to them
as men. It is in reality an act of homage paid to God, the provident Creator
of the universe, who has decreed that men's dealings with one another be
regulated in accordance with that order which He Himself has established.
Id. 50.
81 See Pope, supra note 78; see also David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon,
Introduction to Second Vatican Council, Vatican II and Post-Conciliar Catholic
Social Teaching, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 163,
163 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) ('[NIew stress of human
liberties and human rights occupied a central place with Pope John XXIII and Pope
Paul VI.").
82 Pope, supra note 78.
8 Id.
84 PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 79, 9.
8 See, e.g., id. 27; see also id. 139 ("The common good of individual States is
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A call for legal protection for human rights flows easily from
the concept of human dignity. Pacem in Terris links the two
ideas. At paragraph twenty-seven, the document recognizes the
role of civil authority in the sphere of human dignity: The
human person "is entitled to the legal protection of his rights,
and such protection must be effective, unbiased, and strictly
just."6
Legal norms instituted to ensure the protection of human
dignity are inextricably linked to the principle of the common
good. This is a major theme of Pacem in Terris. "[T]he common
good is best safeguarded when personal rights and duties are
guaranteed. The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore
be to ensure that these rights are recognized, respected, co-
ordinated, defended and promoted, and that each individual is
enabled to perform his duties more easily." v Without legal
protection crafted by civil authorities, inequity among the world's
population flourishes, and human rights are thus "rendered
totally ineffective.""8
Global inequality raises special concerns for the Church,
whose teaching acknowledges that "in defining the scope of a just
freedom within which individual citizens may live lives worthy of
human dignity, the rulers of some nations have been far too
restrictive." 9 John XXIII addresses this issue by reminding the
faithful that the "common good" extends beyond borders: "We
must bear in mind that of its very nature civil authority exists,
not to confine men within the frontiers of their own nations, but
primarily to protect the common good of the State, which
certainly cannot be divorced from the common good of the entire
human family."90 The Compendium of Catholic Social Thought
also speaks to the need of international law to safeguard human
something that cannot be determined without reference to the human
person .... Hence the public authority of the world community must likewise have
as its special aim the recognition, respect, safeguarding and promotion of the rights
of the human person."); id. 143-44 (noting that the U.N.'s Universal Declaration
of Human Rights acknowledged the dignity of the human person).
" Id. 1 27. John XXIII quotes Pius XII's 1942 Christmas Eve Radio Message: "In
consequence of that juridical order willed by God, man has his own inalienable right
to juridical security. To him is assigned a certain, well-defined sphere of law,
immune from arbitrary attack." Id.
87 Id. 60.
8' See id. 63.
89 Id. 104.
0 Id. 98.
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rights everywhere. A "true international community"9' must be
structured to maximize the common good, "aware that the
common good of a nation cannot be separated from the good of
the entire human family."92
C. The United Nations Plays an Important Role in Protecting
Human Dignity
"Peace is not merely the absence of war."93 Church teaching
suggests that there is a role for organizations like the United
Nations. In many ways, the United Nations promotes the social
principles emphasized by the Church by striving toward the
Catholic idea of peace.94 The Church's conceptualization of peace
encompasses both an international order predicated on stability,
security, and justice,9 and one based on the preservation of
human dignity.96 In the international context, the human dignity
aspect of peace is threatened where "truth and justice" are absent
from interstate dialogue,97 or where "excessive economic or social
inequalities" abound. The United Nations embodies Catholic
principles by working toward these goals.
The United Nations lists the promotion of stability and
security first among its declared purposes,99 and it sets about this
9' PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, Compendium of the Social
Doctrine of the Church 433 (2004) [hereinafter Compendium] (emphasis omitted).
92 Id. 434.
93 PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUMETSPES 78 (1965).
" See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl., art. I. Moreover, the preamble states that the
organization is "[d]etermined ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
[and] in the dignity and worth of the human person." U.N. Charter pmbl.
9' See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1909 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
CATECHISM] ("[Tihe common good requires peace, that is, the stability and security
of a just order. It presupposes that authority should ensure by morally acceptable
means the security of society and its members. It is the basis for the right to
legitimate personal and collective defence."); see also id. 2304 ("Peace is the
tranquility of order. Peace is the work of justice and the effect of charity." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
96 See id. 2304 ("Peace is not merely the absence of war, and it is not limited to
maintaining a balance of powers between adversaries. Peace cannot be attained on
earth without safeguarding the goods of persons, free communication among men,
respect for the dignity of persons and peoples, and the assiduous practice of
fraternity.").
9' PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 79.
98 CATECHISM, supra note 95, 2317.
99 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, states that one purpose of the United Nations is
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
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task in a wide variety of ways.10 The Charter that governs the
organization and binds its signatories is structured in a way to
promote stability and security. It bans altogether the use of
aggressive force, 10' and it substantially curtails member states'
ability to use force in other instances, as well. 02 This comports
with the Church's position on war. The Church calls on all
nations "to reject definitively the idea that justice can be sought
through recourse to war."10 3  The Second Vatican Council
recognized the need for a provision like the Charter's Article 2(4)
in international law, explaining that "[iit is our clear duty,
therefore, to strain every muscle in working for the time when all
war can be completely outlawed by international consent."0 4
Further, it called on a "universal public authority"-like the
United Nations-to accomplish this goal. 05
The United Nations' bureaucratic organization promotes
stability, also. The Security Council encourages disagreeing
nations to reach peaceful settlements, and can mediate the
dispute itself.0 6 Further, the work in the disarmament area
answers John XXIII's call in Pacem in Terris for a change in the
way nations view one another: "[Tihe fundamental principles
upon which peace is based in today's world [must] be replaced by
an altogether different one, namely, the realization that true and
lasting peace among nations cannot consist in the possession of
an equal supply of armaments but only in mutual trust."07 The
organization works across borders to reduce nuclear arsenals,
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace ....
Id.
100 See generally United Nations, Peace and Security Resources in the United
Nations System, http://www.un.org/issues/m-peace.html (last visited July 12, 2008)
(listing the departments and system offices of the United Nations assigned with the
task of promoting peace and stability).
'o U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also supra Part II.
102 See supra Part II.
1 Compendium, supra note 91, 438 (emphasis omitted).
"o GAUDIUMETSPES, supra note 93, 81.
105 Id.
'o See United Nations, U.N. Security Council: Background, http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/unscbackground.html (last visited July 12, 2007).
107 PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 79, 113.
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restrict illegal nuclear trafficking, and promote a nuclear test-
ban treaty.1 08
The United Nations also strives toward achieving Catholic
teaching's notion of justice through organs such as international
courts. The International Court of Justice in The Hague
peacefully resolves disputes between nations by applying
recognized international law.0 9 Through the Security Council,
the United Nations also administers international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These bodies,
unlike the International Court of Justice, bring accountability to
individual wrongdoers."' The International Criminal Court, an
entity separate from the United Nations, can nevertheless hear
disputes referred to it by the Security Council."'
The United Nations stresses human dignity by protecting
human rights and addressing social and economic inequalities."2
In the preamble to the Charter, the founders explained that the
organization would work for equal rights and human dignity, as
well as "social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom.""' Toward that end, the founders declared that the
organization would work toward "promotion of the economic and
social advancement of all peoples,"" 4 a goal echoed in Pacem in
Terris, which calls on governments to give "considerable care and
thought to the question of social as well as economic progress" of
the citizens." 5  The organization's Secretariat has put human
rights protection at the forefront of its agenda in recent years. 1
16
108 See United Nations, Disarmament Issues, http://disarmament.un.org/issue.
htm (last visited July 11, 2008).
109 See United Nations, The International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org
(follow "English" hyperlink; then follow "The Court" hyperlink) (last visited July 11,
2008).
110 The International Court of Justice hears matters between states and gives
advisory opinions to other international bodies. Id.
111 See International Criminal Court, How the Court Works, http://www.icc-
cpi.intlabout/ataglance/works.html (last visited July 9, 2008).
112 Pope Paul VI said: "The present solidarity of mankind also calls for a revival
of greater international cooperation in the economic field." GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra
note 93, 85; see also id. 86 ("It is the role of the international community to
coordinate and promote development, but in such a way that the resources
earmarked for this purpose will be allocated as effectively as possible, and with
complete equity.").
... U.N. Charter pmbl.
114 Id.
115 PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 79, 64.
11 See Kofi A. Annan, Sec'y-Gen., United Nations, Address to Mark
International Human Rights Day (Dec. 8, 2006), http://hrw.org/un/pdfs/annan-
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The organization devotes significant resources in a variety of
areas to promote these goals. Two examples are the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, which works to protect
human rights internationally,117 and the Economic and Social
Council, which studies policies geared toward raising social and
economic conditions around the globe."'
The Church recognizes the contributions the United Nations
makes in securing human dignity worldwide, and addresses them
directly in some of its teaching. In Pacem in Terris, John XXIII
called the goal of the organization's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights one "to be sought by all peoples and all
nations."'1 9 It is the Church's "earnest wish," he wrote, "that the
United Nations Organization may be able progressively to adapt
its structure and methods of operation to the magnitude and
nobility of its tasks."20 In the United States, Catholic Bishops
believe the United Nations is an important tool for social
change. 2' Through American diplomats, the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops has attempted to engage the
organization on issues like global poverty, HIV/AIDS, and debt
relief.122
There is ample support that the United Nations achieves
some of its laudable goals. 23 According to a study by the Human
Security Centre, armed conflict has drastically declined since the
end of the Cold War. 24 Moreover, since that time, conflicts that
addressl20806.pdf. Annan explained that "[olne of my priorities as Secretary-
General has been to try and restore that hope, by making human rights central to all
the UN's work." Id.
117 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandate,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/Mandate.aspx (last visited July 11, 2008).
118 See United Nations Economic & Social Council, Background, http://www.
un.org/docs/ecosoc/ecosoc background.html (last visited July 11, 2008).
119 See PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 79, 143.
120 Id. 145.
121 Letter from John H. Ricard, S.S.J., Most Reverend, U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops, to Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 7,
2005), http://hrw.org/un/pdfs/annan-addressl208O6.pdf (calling the 2005 annual
meeting of the organization an "unparalleled opportunity" to address global human
rights issues).
122 See, e.g., id.
123 The United Nations has significant shortcomings, also. See infra Part IV.D.
The organization is partly to blame for its inability to tout its successes in an effort
to overcome the detail its failures receive in the media. See Grace Wise, Letter to the
Editor, U.N. Peacekeeping Is a Quiet Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at A14.
124 Philip Stephens, The Paradox of Being Insecure in a Far More Peaceful
World, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 2006, at 17.
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have arisen have been far less deadly than in times past.125 After
World War II, each war claimed, on average, 38,000 people. 26 By
the start of the twenty-first century, that figure had fallen to
600. 127
Arguably, the United Nations' successes in these areas have
been "countless."28  Sanctions have proven effective in
encouraging aberrant nations to comply with international law.
In Libya, sanctions motivated Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi to
hand over suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing to an
international tribunal. 129  Sanctions, coupled with arms
inspections, also apparently worked in deterring Saddam
Hussein from pursuing a weapons program. 3 ° The United
Nations has also succeeded where sanctions failed and troops
were needed on the ground. For example, its 2001 peacekeeping
mission to institute a buffer zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea
was hailed as a success.131 The organization was also praised for
its efforts to foster peaceful, democratic elections in Angola. 132
Finally, in general terms, international organizations like
the United Nations have value that extends beyond their specific
initiatives because they address the collective action problem
that plagues international affairs and paralyzes many states
from taking action. The information-sharing aspect of the
Security Council helps address this problem. Additionally, the
peer pressure that international norms put on individual states
encourages compliance with basic obligations, 13 3 and efforts to
engage otherwise recalcitrant nations benefit every state. 134
125 See id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See supra note 34.
0 Editorial, A Success Worth Noting in Iraq, supra note 35, § 4, at 14 (noting
that the combination of embargoes, arms inspections, and American military
deterrence "look far more effective than once thought"); see also Robert Wright, Op-
Ed., Making the U.N. Look Good, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at A21.
1"1 Ethiopia Begins Withdrawing Army from Eritrea, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001,
at A3 ("The deployment is seen as a success story in the making for the United
Nations after a string of troubled peacekeeping missions in Africa.").
132 See Julian Ozanne, Civil War Overhang Threatens Angola Poll, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 25, 1992, at 6 ("Much of the credit for the success of the transition
also goes to the United Nations. . .
133 See Yoo, supra note 73.
134 See, e.g., Warren Hoge, On Mideast Trip, U.N. Chief Sought to Expand New
Role, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A10 (reporting that on a recent international trip,
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D. The Value of the United Nations Is Only as Great as Its
Ability To Protect Human Dignity
The United Nations has many noble goals that fit nicely
within the teachings of the Catholic Church. For all its success
in the human rights area, however, it seems to have had just as
many failures. 135  The organization has acted inadequately-or
not at all-in the face of a series of human rights atrocities.136 In
these instances, the critical issue has been whether individual
nations should sit outraged on the sidelines, prohibited from
action by the United Nations Charter. The final section of this
Note answers this question in the negative. Catholic social
principles teach that the United Nations is only as valuable as its
ability to defend human dignity.137 Where it fails-or worse,
obstructs-it should be pushed aside by states willing to act
unilaterally to protect mankind.
Pacem in Terris makes reference to this dilemma. On one
hand, "[tihere can be no doubt that State juridical system which
conforms to the principles of justice and rightness, and
corresponds to the degree of civic maturity evinced by the State
in question, is highly conducive to the attainment of the common
good." 38 Yet, "the relations between public authorities of the
same State[] are sometimes seen to be of so ambiguous and
explosive a nature, that they are not susceptible of being
regulated by any hard and fast system of laws." 39 Part IV.C
argued that the United Nations, with the Charter as its
constitutive document, is valuable to the world, especially in the
context of human dignity.1 40 The Charter's absolute prohibition
on unilateral humanitarian intervention is a stark example of a
"hard and fast" law that should give way to the more important
ideal of protecting human dignity.
From the Catholic perspective, such an inflexible provision
must give way when it obstructs the preservation of human
dignity. As Pacem in Terris explains, "laws and decrees passed
new Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reached out to leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Lebanon-nations that "make a habit of snubbing the United Nations").
135 A Google search on April 12, 2007 for "'United Nations' and 'Failure'"
returned about 2.2 million results.
138 Rwanda and Kosovo are two examples.
"' See, e.g., Compendium, supra note 91, 441.
131 PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 79, 70.
139 Id. 72.
140 See supra Part IV.C.
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in contravention of the moral order, and hence of the divine will,
can have no binding force in conscience, since 'it is right to obey
God rather than men.' ",141 In this way, "[aluthority is before all
else a moral force.""' That moral force is eroded completely
when the organization fails in times of great need, and at the
same time its Charter prohibits unilateral action aimed at the
greater good.143
Sadly, recent history is replete with stark failures by the
United Nations. In Rwanda, hundreds of thousands people died
in a little over three months; what little presence the United
Nations had in the region to begin with was erased when its
forces withdrew during the slaughter."' The organization did
not even officially recognize this was genocide until after the
killing was over. 145  In Darfur, the United Nations was again
plagued by obstacles that prevented a swift response to the
bloody ethnic conflict. 146  In an editorial, the New York Times
slammed the organization for its failure in Darfur: "The United
Nations has repeatedly disgraced itself by its halfhearted and
inadequate response to the gravest human rights challenge it has
faced since it failed the same genocide test in Rwanda more than
a decade ago."147
The United Nations' moral force is also eroded by practical
limitations that hinder its credibility by making effective
responses to human rights crises difficult to achieve, and thus
rare. This broad concern is recognized in Pacem in Terris. It
explains that
[iun the past rulers of States seem to have been able to make
sufficient provision for the universal common good through the
141 PACEMIN TERRIS, supra note 79, 51 (quoting Acts 5:29).
1 Id. 48. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church explains that
the United Nations is not an infallible solution to the world's ills. While the Church
"views positively the role of intergovernmental organizations,... it has
reservations when they address problems incorrectly." Compendium, supra note 91,
440.
'4 In arguing that the Charter's prohibition against unilateral intervention is
immoral, it need not address whether there were nations waiting to intervene but
did not because of the plain language of the document. The Charter's immorality
transcends issues of but for causation.
I" See The Real Hero of Hotel Rwanda, U.S. CATHOLIC, Feb. 2006, at 18, 18.
145 See id. at 19.
141 See generally Michael Petrou, Genocide in Slow Motion, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 11,
2006, at 35 (discussing the unfolding tragedy in Darfur).
147 Editorial, Talking Darfur to Death, supra note 5.
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normal diplomatic channels, or by top-level meetings and
discussions, treaties and agreements; by using, that is, the ways
and means suggested by the natural law, the law of nations, or
international law.148
The Charter is precisely such an example of international
law. Pacem in Terris cautions, however, that failure in this area
is not due to world leaders' lack of "sincerity and enterprise" but
because "their authority is not sufficiently influential."49
The United Nations lacks adequate authority for a variety of
reasons which will be addressed in turn. At the outset, part of
the body's ineffectual nature stems from the consensual basis of
its existence; acting on a consensus basis always makes forward
progress difficult. 150  Member states were not forced to join the
organization; each nation affirmatively ratified the Charter. In
the larger General Assembly, where approval from more
delegations is required than in the Security Council, resolutions
that pass can be so watered-down as to be ineffectual. 5 1
The United Nations reflects this lack of adequate authority
in its structure, particularly the system of single veto
deliberation in the Security Council. 2 This procedural hurdle is
particularly difficult to overcome when human rights are the
subject of the debate, thanks to China's foreign policy. For any
meaningful resolution to be issued,1 53 China, as a permanent
member of the Council, must agree or at least abstain from
disagreeing. It is reluctant to acquiesce, lest a precedent be set
for dealing with human rights abuses it commits against its own
people.154  One of the strongest advocates of protecting the
148 PACEMIN TERRIS, supra note 79,1 133.
149 Id. 134.
150 See The Real Hero of Hotel Rwanda, supra note 144, at 19. Paul
Rusesabagina, the hero portrayed in the recent film "Hotel Rwanda," characterized
the U.N.'s flaws as being largely procedural: "The way this gets decided is on a
consensus basis. They call people, they sit down, they discuss. But at the end of the
day, the week, the month, there is no decision. And by the time a decision comes, it
is diluted because of political or economic interests." Id.
151 See Sanger, supra note 8 ("[Llanguage is so watered down that discerning its
specific meaning is difficult at best.").
152 U.N. Charter Article 27 requires Security Council Resolutions to be passed
with affirmative votes from nine of the fifteen members, including concurring votes
from the five permanent members-the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, and China. U.N. Charter art. 27, paras. 1-3.
153 Recall that the Security Council is the only U.N. organ that can authorize
force under Chapter VII of the Charter. See supra Part II.
14 See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 8 (noting China's unwillingness to intervene in
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concept of state sovereignty at the expense of human rights,
China was responsible for delaying Security Council
authorization for a peacekeeping force in Darfur. 115 Moreover,
the resolution that was eventually passed contained a provision
that required the Sudanese government-the human rights
perpetrators-to acquiesce to the international force.156  China
does not block every effort to protect human rights, and it
pressured the Sudanese government to welcome peacekeepers,
but it will obstruct United Nations action where it fears that the
world may find a correlation to its activities in Tibet and
Taiwan.1 7
Similar structural flaws exist in other United Nations
organs, as well. When the United Nations Human Rights
Council condemned the violations in Darfur in March 2007, it
failed to assign responsibility for the atrocities to the Sudanese
government, despite the council's own investigation that pointed
that way.55 That the condemnation "was made possible by the
welcome willingness of several African countries to set aside
their usual reluctance to talk about their continent's human
rights problems,' 59 should not excuse its failure to place blame
where it belongs.
Other practical limitations on the organization include lack
of financial and military support for its efforts. 6 ° Many fear the
Kosovo or East Timor for fear of subsequent intervention in Taiwan or Tibet).
I, See James Traub, The World According to China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006,
(Magazine), at 24, 27 (discussing China's impact on the United Nations, including
analysis of its role in addressing the Darfur conflict).
156 See, e.g., Editorial, Talking Darfur to Death, supra note 5 (blaming China for
obstructing the U.N.'s ability to insert the peacekeeping force that the Security
Council authorized into the Sudan).
157 See Miller, supra note 34 (quoting Kenneth Roth, executive director of the
Human Rights Watch). The United Nations eventually was able to pass a Security
Council resolution authorizing a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, but only on the
condition that the Sudanese government acquiesce to an international force. After
much pressure, the government dropped its objections. See Rob Crilly, Sudanese
Want Darfur Action, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 24, 2007, at 4, 4. According to
one estimate, approximately 300,000 people have died so far in the tragedy. The
Bear Facts, ECONOMIST (London), Dec. 8, 2007, at 64, 64.
158 See Editorial, Talking Darfur to Death, supra note 5.
159 Id.
16 Arguably, the U.N.'s logistical problems should be of little consequence in a
debate about whether there should be a unilateral right to intervention, because if
there existed enough nations committed to protecting human rights unilaterally,
these same nations would not have difficulty supporting the United Nations. See,
e.g., Paul Lewis, U.N. Chief Says Abandoning Aid Force for Zaire Was a Mistake,
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United Nations is overmatched because its resources are
inadequate to care for an estimated "40 million refugees and
displaced people." 161  The United Nations has no standing
military, and must rely on contributions from member-states to
fill its peacekeeping ranks. 162  According to one estimate, a
successful peacekeeping mission in the Sudan would require
"hundreds of thousands" of soldiers, more than the amount the
United States has committed to stabilizing Iraq.161 Not just
soldiers are needed; the United Nations also needs police officers
to help keep the peace and train local forces. Recruiting officers
to go protect and serve abroad is not easy. The organization's
recent attempts to recruit New York City officers does not look
promising inasmuch as the city has a hard enough time filling its
own ranks.164
Finally, the United Nations loses moral authority when it
appears selective about the people it helps. Critics charge that
the organization's recent history shows a bias against problems
in Africa. The organization quickly followed up NATO's efforts in
Kosovo by sending a stabilizing force after the fighting was over,
but it withdrew in the midst of suffering in Somalia and Rwanda,
and there are grave doubts about whether the organization will
be able to stem the bloodshed in Darfur. 165
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at A5 (pointing out that the United States owed one
billion dollars in dues). The debate, however, is really about whether a per se bar to
unilateral intervention is immoral where the U.N. fails in the face of human rights
abuses. In any case, Kosovo provides a good example of a group of states acting
without U.N. sanction to stop ethnic cleansing. See generally Barton Gellman, The
Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War, WASH. POST, July
21, 1999, at Al (discussing the diplomatic events leading up to the conflict in
Kosovo).
161 See Miller, supra note 34.
162 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Pentagon Faults U.N. in Kosovo, WASH. POST,
July 21, 1999, at A17 (noting that the United Nations must fill the ranks of its police
force in Kosovo with recruits from member nations).
163 See Petrou, supra note 146.
14 See Associated Press, U.N. Wants NYC Cops for Peacekeeping,
BREITBART.COM, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8OEPQ
1GO&showarticle=1.
165 See Miller, supra note 34 (citing concerns of a close advisor to then-Secretary
General Kofi Annan that Kosovo and Rwanda were two vastly different portraits of
the U.N.'s capabilities); see also Peacekeepers into the Fray, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15,
2008, at 58, 58 (expressing doubt that the large U.N. force deploying to the region
now will be able to quell the fighting). To be fair, the United Nations faces daunting
challenges on the ground in Darfur. The conflict is a complex one, id., and forging
peace among at least fourteen rebel factions will not be easy. See Darfur Bleeds as
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CONCLUSION
In legal terms, the answer to Kofi Annan's question about
whether, when the United Nations fails to act, individual nations
must stand aside in the face of human rights violations is a
regrettable yes. Any honest interpretation of the United Nations
Charter compels this conclusion. Catholic social teaching,
however, demands a right of unilateral humanitarian
intervention because it emphasizes the critical place the
protection of human dignity should have among the concerns of
civil authorities worldwide. The United Nations is the foremost
international organization, and its programs put to practice
many of the Catholic teachings. Nevertheless, its value is only as
great as its commitment to protecting human dignity. Therefore,
to the extent that the Charter's prohibition on interventions
made without Security Council authorization stands in the way
of safeguarding human rights, this provision should have no
force.
Talks Fail, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2007, at 58, 58.
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